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THE PUBLIC PENSION CRISIS THROUGH THE LENS OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTORY LAW
KRISTEN BARNES *
I. INTRODUCTION
A study of cities and states in crisis would not be complete without
analyzing public pensions. Public pension debt is a major contributing factor to the economically precarious condition of many states and municipalities. 1 With financial disaster looming, cities and states are devising creative
ways to reduce their pension debt liabilities or to escape payment entirely, 2
and insulate themselves from any legal repercussions. 3 Increasingly, governments are fixating on state constitutions in an effort to identify solutions
to their fiscal dilemmas, which have been exacerbated by public pension
obligations. 4 The state constitution is one logical site of interest given its
position in creating, structuring, and preserving pension rights. State statutes delineating pension rights are also relevant to this analysis.
This Article has three primary objectives. First, it seeks to identify the
legal nature and limits of pension rights by examining them primarily
through the frames of state constitutional and statutory law. Specifically,
the emphasis is on the formulation of pension rights and the state’s, and to
some extent cities, obligations under publicly managed retirement systems.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law, J.D. Harvard Law School, Ph.D.
Duke University.
1. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE PENSIONS FUNDING GAP: CHALLENGES
PERSIST, 1–10, (2015),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/07/pewstates_statepensiondebtbrief_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YRD2-4U33]. See also THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, A WIDENING GAP IN CITIES:
SHORTFALLS FOR FUNDING FOR PENSIONS AND RETIREE HEALTH CARE, 1–56 (2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/pewcitypensionsreportpdf.pdf.
2. See Mark Brown, Could the City Walk Away From Pension Obligations, CHI. SUN TIMES
(May 19, 2015), http://chicago.suntimes.com/columnists/brown-could-the-city-walk-away-frompension-obligations/ [https://perma.cc/QMQ5-E9WQ].
3. See Eric Madiar, Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois? An Analysis
of Article XIII, Section 5 of Illinois Constitution, 48. J. MARSHALL L. REV. 167, 242–85 (2014) (discussing legality of proposal to revise state pensions).
4. Finance Professor Joshua Rauh, who has written extensively about pensions, has been quoted
as advocating the amendment of state constitutions for “current employees.” See Monica Davey &
Mary Williams Walsh, Pensions and Politics Fuel Crisis in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/politics/illinois-pension-crisis.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/5SJL-B4A8].
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7KH SDSHU VFUXWLQL]HV KRZ GLIIHUHQW FRQVWUXFWLRQV LPSDFW WKH VWUHQJWK RI
SHQVLRQKROGHUV¶ULJKWVE\DQDO\]LQJDQGFRPSDULQJVWDWXWRU\ODQJXDJHDQG
NH\VWDWHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURYLVLRQVJURXQGHGLQWKHODZRIFRQWUDFWSURSHU
W\DQGGXHSURFHVVJXDUDQWHHV6HFRQGWKLVSLHFHUHIHUHQFHVVHYHUDOFDVHV
LQYROYLQJWKHUHVWUXFWXULQJRISHQVLRQEHQHILWVWRFRQVLGHUKRZVWDWHFRXUWV
KDYH LQWHUSUHWHG WKH UHOHYDQW FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DQG VWDWXWRU\ SURYLVLRQV DQG
KRZMXGJHVKDYHUHVSRQGHGWROHJLVODWLYHDWWHPSWVWRUHVWUXFWXUHSHQVLRQV
7KH FDVHV LQFOXGH In re Pension Reform Litigation Kanerva v. Weems
Smith v. Board of Trustees of Louisiana Employees’ Retirement System,
State ex rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Retirement Board DQGIn re City of
Detroit, Michigan 7KH\ FRYHU WKH MXULVGLFWLRQV RI ,OOLQRLV /RXLVLDQD
2KLRDQG0LFKLJDQ5HJDUGLQJ0LFKLJDQWKHSDSHULVFRQFHUQHGZLWKKRZ
WKH IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW¶V LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ WKLV UHDOP DIIHFWV VWDWH FRQVWLWX
WLRQDOSURYLVLRQVGHVLJQHGWRSURYLGHSURWHFWLRQWRSHQVLRQKROGHUV¶ULJKWV
8QGHUWKLVKHDGLQJWKLVSDSHUH[SORUHVWKHOHJDOOLPLWRISHQVLRQULJKWVLQ
WKHFRQWH[WRIEDQNUXSWF\LWIXUWKHURIIHUVDEULHIGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHUROHWKH
IHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWPD\SOD\LQUHVROYLQJSHQVLRQEDWWOHVEXWRQO\WRJLYH
VRPH DWWHQWLRQ WR PHFKDQLVPV WKDW PD\ EH QHHGHG LI WKHUH LV D VWDOHPDWH
EHWZHHQXQDVVDLODEOHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\JURXQGHGSHQVLRQULJKWVDQGVWDWHRU
PXQLFLSDOLQVROYHQF\7KLUGWKHSDSHUFRQVLGHUVWKHDELOLW\WRLQIOXHQFHWKH
ILVFDOEHKDYLRURIJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOVWKURXJKVWDWHFRQVWLWXWLRQV
5LFKDUG%ULIIDXOW¶VZRUNRQVSHQGLQJDQGWD[OLPLWVLQVWDWHFRQVWLWX
WLRQVLVUHOHYDQWWRWKHSDSHU¶VWKLUGREMHFWLYH,Q³7KH'LVIDYRUHG&RQVWLWX
WLRQ6WDWH)LVFDO/LPLWVDQG6WDWH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO/DZ´%ULIIDXOWFRQFOXGHV
WKDW WKHUH LV D GLVMXQFWXUH EHWZHHQ D VWUDWHJ\ RI SODFLQJ VSHQGLQJ OLPLWV
ZLWKLQFRQVWLWXWLRQVLQRUGHUWRFXUWDLOWKHSUDFWLFHRIGLUHFWLQJVWDWHILQDQF
HVWRZDUGVWKHEHQHILWRISULYDWHHQWLWLHVDQGDSROLWLFDOUHDOLW\GHILQHGE\
JRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOVZKRVXFFHVVIXOO\HYDGHWKHUHVWULFWLRQVLPSRVHGXSRQ
WKHP $GYRFDWHV RI ILVFDOO\ UHVWULFWLYH PHDVXUHV VXFK DV VSHQGLQJ DQG
WD[DWLRQOLPLWVPDLQWDLQWKDWWKH\DUHQHHGHGVRWKDWSXEOLFILQDQFHVZLOOEH
DYDLODEOHIRUSXEOLFUHVRXUFHVVXFKDVHGXFDWLRQLQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGKHDOWK


 ,/ ,OO 

 ,/ ,OO 

 6RG /D 

 1(G 2KLR 

 %5 ('0LFK 

 $FFRUGLQJ WR %ULIIDXOW ³>W@KHUH LV DQ HQRUPRXV JDS EHWZHHQ WKH ZULWWHQ SURYLVLRQV RI VWDWH
FRQVWLWXWLRQV DQG DFWXDO SUDFWLFH 6WDWH OHJLVODWXUHV DQG ORFDO JRYHUQPHQWV KDYH UHSHDWHGO\ VRXJKW WR
H[SDQGWKHVFRSHRIµSXEOLFSXUSRVH¶DQGWRVOLSWKHUHVWUDLQWVRIWD[DQGGHEWOLPLWV´5LFKDUG%ULIIDXOW
The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law,587*(56 /-
   FLWDWLRQRPLWWHG 
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care costs. 11 Rather than accomplishing responsibly restrained fiscal governance, however, “[d]ebt limits have affected the form of state and local
debt, but they do not appear to have significantly affected the total amount
of debt.” 12 Correlatively, instead of state constitutions being insulated from
the politics that can undermine the public interest, Briffault argues that the
monetary restraining provisions designed to protect public goals end up
being re-entangled in politics. 13 State government officials and legislators
ultimately frustrate the provisions by crafting laws to circumvent them.
Judges further facilitate the evasion of revenue constraints by deferring to
the legislature when interpreting the laws. 14
This paper reflects on whether Briffault’s conclusion—that regardless
of the constitutional fiscal protections designed to benefit the public, government will find a way to navigate around them—also holds true with
respect to constitutional protection for pensions. The piece probes the issue
of whether having pension protections grounded in the state constitution
actually helps public employees—by ensuring that state and local governments remain legally obligated to pay them the benefits they were promised
when they were hired—or whether the protections are nullified by the evasive actions of state legislatures and other government officials.
State constitutional provisions can function as effective barriers to legislative maneuvers that are aimed at revising pension plans to the detriment
of existing plan participants. The efficacy of the provisions depends upon
several matters: (i) whether the provisions delineate a contractual relationship between the public employer (i.e. the state or related governmental
entity) and employee; (ii) whether the pension clearly defines the vesting of
the employee’s interest in the pension, or leaves such terms open to interpretation; and (iii) whether the state constitution addresses the ability of
legislative powers to diminish pension rights or the applicability of the
state’s sovereign police powers to those rights. Finally, the influence of the
judiciary in construing the scope of the enforceable rights of public workers
should not be discounted.
Without clearly defined rights and restrictions, there is no decisive answer regarding the course of action courts will pursue. Case law across
jurisdictions bifurcates on interpreting protective provisions broadly to hold
laws that negatively revise public pensions, constitutionally invalid, or
finding persuasive the ominous financial forecasts of government officials
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 908–09.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 956.
Id. 955–57.
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and the lack of clarity in defining pension rights to uphold legislative revisions. Finding viable solutions is a matter of critical urgency related to the
financial solvency of local and state governments. The crisis calls for governments to adopt sage well-balanced strategies that are prospective looking, in that they consider the stability and health of the region, and they do
not severely harm pensioners, economically. This means that if the state
constitution lacks protection pension language, it should be amended,
where possible, to add the recommendations proposed herein. If there are
constitution-based protections but legislators, mayors, and governors may
exploit their deficiencies, the protections should be reinforced to guard
against such political gamesmanship. Even though these recommendations
require the requisite political will and legally and formally commit governmental entities to satisfying pension obligation costs, this is the proper
course of action, as it requires governments to fulfill the promises they
made to their workers. Unless the government apprised job candidates that
the proposed benefits were conditional, rather than guaranteed, it is likely
that candidates evaluated their offers based upon the full range of benefits
(e.g., cost of living adjustments, health care) that were presented to them, at
the time of the offer. In general, states should identify solutions that do not
eviscerate pension obligations. To ensure that pension rights are firmly
established, drafters of the constitutional provisions should take heed of
this Article’s critical advice. If states and municipalities treat pensions in
the manner advocated herein, it would not only benefit public sector workers but also, stabilize regional economies.
This paper proceeds as follows: Part II discusses the scope of the
problem by focusing on four states, Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio, and Michigan; next, Part III analyzes the various approaches states have taken towards pensions rights in state constitutions and statutes and the different
strategies deployed to restructure public pensions; this section also offers
recommendations for balancing the interests of pensioners and state and
local governments; finally, Part IV concludes the paper.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC PENSIONS PROBLEM AND STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES FOR TACKLING IT
Many cities and states are experiencing a crisis related to their public
defined benefit pension plans. 15 The Pew Charitable Trusts reports that in
15. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THE STATE PENSIONS FUNDING GAP, supra note 1, at 1.
Michelle Wilde Anderson comments that “[e]ven with the recovery of pension assets on the stock
market and the passage of legal reforms that require more cautious pension fund valuation going forward, a worrisome number of local budgets are dragged down by unfunded liabilities for pensions and
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2013, state pension deficits for the nation were at “$968 billion.” 16 The
deficit refers to the gap between the retirement benefits the government has
already promised to public workers at the time of their employment and
“the funding available to meet those obligations.” 17 Courts, political constituencies, the legislature, and government officials should be well informed of the intricacies related to financing public pensions and the
primary factors fueling the crisis in order to properly address this massive
complex problem. A preliminary step to gaining a firm grasp of the matter
is acquiring an understanding of the component parts of pensions and the
historical, social, and economic context in which public employers developed plans of this type to achieve several goals. These objectives include
managing budgets, deferring compensation, and competing effectively with
other jurisdictions for workers by offering a secure financial package for
the future.
Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua Rauh explain the mechanics of a defined benefit (“DB”) pension:
In a defined benefit pension plan, the employer promises the employee
an annual payment that begins when the employee retires, where the annual payment depends on the employee’s age, tenure, and late-career salary. 18

Funding for defined benefit plans is composed of monetary contributions from a public sector employer and its employees, and the investment
returns on the contributions. 19 There are various aspects to public pension
governance. Depending upon whether municipal or state pensions are at
issue, the entities responsible for governance may include governors,
mayors, pension boards, and the state legislature. 20 Ideally, the participants
(i.e. state or local governing entities and the employees) make the requisite
contributions over a period of time, and their contributions are invested
periodically and responsibly so that, as each employee-participant retires,
there are sufficient funds to pay the pension benefits. Employers also may

other post-employment benefits.” Michelle W. Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J.
1118, 1146 (2014).
16. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THE STATE PENSIONS FUNDING GAP, supra note 1, at 1.
17. Id.
18. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension
Plans, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 191 (2009).
19. LANCE CHRISTENSEN & ADRIAN MOORE, PENSION REFORM HANDBOOK: A STARTER GUIDE
REFORMERS,
1–132
(2014),
http://reason.org/files/pension_reform_handbook.pdf
FOR
[https://perma.cc/ANY9-RKC4].
20. See Madiar, supra note 3 at 170. See also CHRISTENSEN & MOORE, supra note 19, at 51.
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LQFOXGH inter alia FRVW RI OLYLQJ DGMXVWPHQWV WR DGGUHVV LQIODWLRQ DQG
KHDOWKFDUHEHQHILWVDVSDUWRIDQHPSOR\HH¶VEHQHILWVSDFNDJH
7KHUH DUH QXPHURXV DVVXPSWLRQV EXLOW LQWR WKLV LGHDO PRGHO )RU D
SXEOLFSHQVLRQUHWLUHPHQWV\VWHPWRRSHUDWHSURSHUO\WKHQHFHVVDU\OHYHORI
FRQWULEXWLRQV PXVW EH DFFXUDWHO\ FDOFXODWHG 7KH VWDWH JRYHUQPHQW PXVW
DFWXDOO\PDNHWKHFRQWULEXWLRQVVRWKDWWKHLQYHVWHGDPRXQWVFDQDFFXPX
ODWH HDUQLQJV DQG WKH LQYHVWPHQW YHKLFOHV VHOHFWHG PXVW EH RQHV WKDW DUH
OLNHO\WR\LHOGVXIILFLHQWUHWXUQV2IWHQWKLVLVQRWWKHFDVH,QDGGLWLRQWR
XVLQJLPSUHFLVHPHWULFVVRPHFLWLHVDQGVWDWHVKDYHIDLOHGWRPDNHWKHLU
UHTXLVLWHFRQWULEXWLRQVFRQVLVWHQWO\LQWKHSURSHUDPRXQWV
7KH*RYHUQPHQW$FFRXQWLQJ6WDQGDUGV%RDUG ³*$6%´ LVRQHRIWKH
FKLHIFRQWULEXWRUVWRWKHFXUUHQWSUHYDLOLQJSHQVLRQLVVXHV*$6%LVDSUL
YDWH QRQSURILW HQWLW\ ,W LV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU LVVXLQJ JHQHUDOO\ DFFHSWHG DF
FRXQWLQJ SULQFLSOHV NQRZQ DV *$$3 0DQ\ SXEOLF SHQVLRQ V\VWHPV
DGKHUHGWRWKHSROLFLHVDQGSURFHGXUHVRI*$6%HYHQWKRXJKGXULQJWKH
SULPDU\\HDUVZKHQSHQVLRQGHEWZDVH[SRQHQWLDOO\JURZLQJWKHDFFRXQW
LQJSULQFLSOHV³ZHUHQRWIHGHUDOODZVQRUZDVWKH6(&DOORZHGWRHQIRUFH
WKHP´7KHUHZHUHWZRHVVHQWLDOSUREOHPVZLWK*$6%¶VROGIUDPHZRUN
ILUVWFRQWULEXWLRQVWRIXQGWKHV\VWHPDQGVHFRQGWKHFDOFXODWLRQRIOLDELOL
WLHV²ZKLFKUHODWHVWRWKHOHYHORIFRQWULEXWLRQVSDUWLFLSDQWVQHHGWRPDNH
WRHQVXUHVROYHQF\*$6%GLGQRWPDQGDWHWKDWSXEOLFHQWLWLHVPDNHFRQ


 &+5,67(16(1 0225(supraQRWHDW

 5HJDUGLQJ WKH ODWWHU SRLQW XQOHVV WKH LQYHVWPHQWV DUH IL[HG LQFRPH LQYHVWPHQWV RU VDYLQJV
LQVWUXPHQWVVXFKDVFHUWLILFDWHVRIGHSRVLWRUVRPHERQGVWKH\ZLOOKDYHDQDSSUHFLDEOHGHJUHHRIULVN
7KHSODQDGPLQLVWUDWRU¶VWDVNWKHQLVWRILQGLQYHVWPHQWYHKLFOHVWKDWRIIHUDUHDVRQDEOHDPRXQWRIULVN
DQG UHWXUQ 7KHUH DUH ILQDQFLDO FRQVXOWDQWV WKDW FDQ KHOS LGHQWLI\ WKH DSSURSULDWH LQYHVWPHQWV DQG WR
DVVHVVWKHULVNVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHDFKRIWKHP

 $QGHUVRQsupraQRWHDW±See also7+( 3(: &+$5,7$%/( 758676 $ :,'(1,1*
*$3,1&,7,(6supraQRWHDW±

 7+(3(:&+$5,7$%/(758676$:,'(1,1**$3,1&,7,(6supraQRWHDW±

 ,OOLQRLV IRU H[DPSOH KDV FRQVLVWHQWO\ ODSVHG LQ LWV REOLJDWLRQV WR PDNH WKH VWDWH¶V UHTXLUHG
FRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHSHQVLRQIXQGSee0DGLDUsupraQRWHDW FRPPHQWLQJWKDW,OOLQRLV¶³SHQVLRQ
OLDELOLWLHV VWHP IURP WKH 6WDWH¶V GHFDGHVORQJ IDLOXUH WR PDNH LWV UHTXLUHG FRQWULEXWLRQV WR WKH ILYH
SHQVLRQV\VWHPV´ 

 5REHUW1RY\0DU[ -RVKXD'5DXKThe Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension
Plans-(&213(563

 5REHUW3R]HQ %KULM.KXUXQDTough Choices for the Illinois Pension System+$59 %86
5(9-XQHDW

 6LQFH*$6%KDVXSGDWHGLWVJXLGDQFHVWDQGDUGVWRLGHQWLI\DSSURDFKHVWKDWZLOOSURYLGH
DPRUHDFFXUDWHDVVHVVPHQWRIXQIXQGHGSHQVLRQOLDELOLWLHV7KHODWHVWVWDQGDUGVPD\EHIRXQGRQWKHLU
ZHEVLWH DW KWWSZZZJDVERUJ See also 7+( 3(: &+$5,7$%/( 758676 7+( 67$7( 3(16,216
)81',1* *$3supraQRWHDW ³6WDUWLQJZLWKWKHUHSRUWLQJRIGDWDQHZVWDQGDUGVUHTXLUHGE\
*$6% ZLOO SURYLGH DGGLWLRQDO GDWD WKDW SROLF\PDNHUV FDQ XVH WR VXSSOHPHQW WKH $5& >$FWXDULDO 5H
TXLUHG &RQWULEXWLRQ@ DQG HYDOXDWH WKH ILVFDO KHDOWK RI SODQV DV ZHOO DV SROLFLHV¶ VXIILFLHQF\ WR UHGXFH
SHQVLRQGHEW´ 
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tributions to cover all of its DB plan participants. 29 It only required that the
system have sufficient funds to pay present retirees. 30 Thus, the GASB
approach was setting up a serious issue as to the sustainability of retirement
systems (i.e. whether the plans would be able to deliver the promised benefits to all retirees, as they became due).
Regarding the second matter of GASB’s endorsed method for calculating pension liabilities, Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua Rauh argue that
GASB’s method has resulted in the gross understatement of pension liabilities by many states. 31 Cities are also suffering under the weight of similar
understating problems. 32 Specifically, under GASB’s rules in effect in
1995, “government units were allowed to calculate the net present value of
their pension liabilities using a discount rate based on the expected return
of assets, instead of on US Treasury bonds as required for corporate pension plans.” 33 Since the projected rate of return is used to discount present
pension liability, an estimated high rate of return on the pension fund investments affects the number governments may present as their pension
debt obligation. 34 GASB’s recommended practice incentivized government
entities to overstate the likely return on their investments, which in turn
impacted the characterization of their pension liability and resulted in a
distorted view of the amount of contributions needed to meet pension obligations over time. 35 For example, as Robert Pozen and Bhrij Khurana note:
Illinois used an 8.5% rate to discount its pension liabilities, a rate that reflected its expectations about its long-term investment return. This was

29. Pozen & Khuruna, supra note 27, at 2 (recounting the history of Illinois’ defined benefit
plans).
30. Pozen and Khurana note that, prior to 1986 “GASB had not required states to make contributions to their DB plans based on their future retiree claims, only that they make the payments required
for current retirees.” Pozen & Khuruna, supra note 27, at 2.
31. Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 18, at 192 (arguing that states should not be permitted to
underreport their pension liabilities based upon an inappropriate government accounting standard that
“require[s] them to discount their liabilities at the expected return on their assets” and noting that “state
pension funds are invested in risky assets.”).
32. Stanley J. Garstka & Rick Antle, Can Better Accounting Avert a Pension Crisis?, YALE
INSIGHTS, (2013), 1–9, http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/can-better-accounting-avert-pension-crisis.
33. Pozen and Khuruna, supra note 27, at 4.
34. The connection between the discount rate and decision-making regarding public pension fund
investments is:
American public pension funds are allowed (under rules from the Government Accounting
Standards Board) to discount their liabilities by the expected return on their assets. The higher
the expected return, the higher the discount rate. That means, in turn, that liabilities are lower
and the amount of money which the employer has to put aside today is smaller.
ECONOMIST
(July
30,
2016),
Buttonwood:
Putting
it
all
on
red,
THE
http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21702623-rules-encourage-public-sectorpension-plans-take-more-risk-putting-it-all.
35. Pozen & Khuruna, supra note 27, at 6.
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much higher than the interest rate on 10-year US Treasury bonds of 3.5%
in 2003. 36

Whether pension systems are able to meet their stated expected rate of
return depends upon the performance of their investments. The returns on
the equity investments fluctuate with the market. Some years will be stellar
with high earnings while others will be marked by precipitous declines.
Another aspect then of whether governments are following sound pension
practices is the management of pension funds so that monetary surpluses
are retained to cover the down cycle periods. In the wake of the impending
crisis and the high level of attention being given to pension deficits, GASB
updated and clarified the accounting method for properly measuring pension debt by issuing a new rule in June 2012.37 Applying accounting
measures that accurately assess the value of pension funds is an important
step towards addressing the current condition of public pension debt obligations and averting similar future crises. Presumably, if municipal and
state governments have a realistic assessment of the status of their pension
funds they will comprehend the urgency of making the necessary annual
contributions and will identify strategies (e.g., various taxes) to meet their
obligations.
The literature shows that where there are issues with the financing of
pension obligations, shortfalls are often due to matters firmly within the
control of government entities, appointees, designated pension boards, and
legislatures (“Government Public Pension Decision-makers”). In addressing the challenges of public pension systems, it is important to bear in mind
that, even though pension-holders have input through voting for government representatives and pension board representatives or through actually
serving on the boards, Government Public Pension Decision-makers have
decisive control over numerous functions which relate to the operation of
pension systems and their performance. 38 For example, according to their
respective scope of authority, the decision-makers are responsible for deciding the content of pension benefits, contributing the requisite amount to

36. Pozen & Khuruna, supra note 27, at 4.
37. GASB Rule 68 can be found on its website,
http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Pronouncement_C/GASBSummaryPage&cid=1176160219492.
38. Typically, boards of trustees manage public pension funds. See Public Employee Retirement
System Investments, GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N (Oct. 2009), http://www.gfoa.org/public-employeeretirement-system-investments (“Subject to applicable federal, state, and local laws, and judicial decisions, PERS investment programs are governed by investment policy objectives and constraints established by pension fund fiduciaries (individuals who are given the authority to hold assets for another
party according to a trust agreement). For most public-sector pension plans, investment decisions are
made by a PERS [Public Employee Retirement System] board of trustees comprising elected and/or
appointed fiduciaries.”).
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the pension funds or allocating the requisite amounts to other areas, and the
amount of the contribution. The designated decision-makers also enter into
contracts with pension fund managers, who then select investments and
agree to the payment of investment companies’ fees. 39
How governments perform these duties directly impact the overall
health of pension funds and the financial health of state and local economies. With respect to factors that are outside the control of government
officials—such as severe economic downswings like the Great Recession—these cyclical aspects should be accounted for by the plan manager’s
risk assessment of the portfolio. Negative economic fluctuations should not
serve as an acceptable reason for restructuring pension plans for existing
plan participants.
The fears regarding the public pension crisis are wide-ranging and run
deep, with some states concluding that if they can find no relief from their
pension debt some time in the near future, most, if not all, of their revenues
will need to be directed towards paying pension obligations rather than
providing vital services for residents. 40 For public employment retirees who
are in those states that do not even have the back-up support of social security, their circumstances are worse; Illinois, 41 Louisiana, and Ohio fit in this
category. 42 If state legislatures are permitted to restructure accrued pension
obligations, pensioners in these jurisdictions will need to find an alternative
means to fund their retirement. At some point, the costs are likely to fall on
the larger population in the form of taxes.

39. See Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 18, at 202–04 (analyzing the dismal condition of many
state pension funds and attributing the problems in part to “investment in risky assets that have performed very poorly in the last few years.”). Aleksander Andonov, Yael V. Hochberg, and Joshua D.
Rauh, in their study of municipal and state public pension systems comment that “[t]he Board of administration for a public pension fund is responsible for the management and control of the pension
fund . . . [The board’s responsibilities may include] setting employer contribution rates, determining
investment asset allocations, providing actuarial valuations, and much more.” They conclude that
“[w]ithin fund types . . . the share of state government officials and the share of elected participants is
strongly correlated with several known proxies for poor investment selection in private equity.” Aleksander Andonov, Yael V. Hochberg, & Joshua D. Rauh, Pension Fund Board Composition and Investment Performance: Investment from Private Equity 4, 8 (Hoover Inst., Working Paper No. 16104,
2016),
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/16104__pension_fund_board_composition_and_investment_performance_-_andonov_hochberg_and_rauh.pdf
40. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL
DISTRESS 8 (2013). See also Davey & Walsh, supra note 4, at 4.
41. Not only do participants in non-Social Security states lack the financial cushion that federal
social security funds can provide, the pension plans in those states “are more underfunded than in Social
Security states.” T. Leigh Anenson et al., Reforming Public Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 10
(2014).
42. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE RETIREMENT ADMINISTRATORS (“NASRA”), ISSUE
BRIEF:
STATE
AND
LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
SPENDING
4
(Mar.
2016),
http://www.nasra.org/files/Issue%20Briefs/NASRACostsBrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/56KF-Y89Q].
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States and municipalities may attempt to evade or restructure their
pension obligations in numerous ways. 43 To appreciate the different strategies, one should recognize that pension benefits are often calculated according to formulas that are tied to age, credited service, and salary. 44
Some states have succeeded in revising their plans by distinguishing its
parts. For example, they may take the position that base payments are protected benefits that are concretized at the moment when an employee accepts employment, whereas cost of living adjustments are subject to change
or elimination. 45

43. KEITH BRAINARD & ALEX BROWN, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RET. ADM’RS, SPOTLIGHT ON
SIGNIFICANT REFORMS IN STATES, 1–76 (2016).
Leigh Anenson, Alex Slabaugh, and Karen Lahey provide an in-depth analysis of the varied approaches
which may include: (i) raising the amount of employee contributions: (ii) raising the age required to
draw retirement benefits, (iii) arguing that the debts of the pension funds are ultimately those of the
funds not those of the city, state, or county government and, therefore, if there are any shortfalls that
cannot be covered by the funds, retirees under the relevant fund would suffer the loss, not the taxpayers,
(iv) reducing retirement benefits, inserting timed pauses, or eliminating annual cost of living adjustments, (v) redefining “benefit” to mean contingent (discretionary) future supplement to income rather
than deferred compensation, (vi) changing the health insurance source to coverage under the Affordable
Care Act, (vii) imposing surcharges on utilities such as telecommunications services, (viii) calling for a
state constitutional convention to appeal provisions designed to protect the impairment of benefits, and
(ix) approving municipal bankruptcy for cities that lack any alternative recourse. See Leigh Anenson, et
al., Reforming Public Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 11–14 (2014).
For legislative examples and judicial treatment of some of the proposals, see e.g., S. 1922 98th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014),
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=1922&GAID=12&DocTypeID=SB&LegId=7
3354&SessionID=85&GA=98; Joanna Bartlett, et al. v. Cameron, 316 P.3d 889, 891 (N.M. 2013)
(holding that New Mexico’s Constitution did not “grant[] Retirees a right to an annual cost-of-living
adjustment to their retirement benefit, based on the COLA formula in effect on the date of their retirement, for the entirety of their retirement.”). Regarding item (iii) above, Stephen Patton, Chicago’s
Corporation Counsel advanced this unsuccessful argument in connection with the City’s defense of its
2014 plan, which was passed by the legislature but the struck down by the state supreme court, substantially changing two of the city’s pension funds. See Hal Dardick, Illinois Supreme Court Ruling Forces
City to Find New Fix for 2 Pension Funds, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/g00/news/local/politics/ct-chicago-pension-law-ruling-0325-20160323story.html?i10c.referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F. Moody Investors Service lent
support to this position in the context of rendering its risk evaluations. In its May 2015 report, downgrading Chicago’s bond rating to junk status Moody’s commented that, “Chicago’s ability and willingness to fund annuitant payments, should they be required of the city, is uncertain.” See generally
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, RATING ACTION: MOODY’S DOWNGRADES CHICAGO, IL TO BA1,
AFFECTING $8.9B OF GO, SALES, AND MOTOR FUEL TAX DEBT; OUTLOOK NEGATIVE,
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Chicago-IL-to-Ba1-affecting-89B-of-GO—
PR_325213.
44. Pozen & Khuruna, supra note 27, at 1–2. See also Smith v. Bd. of Tr. of Louisiana State
Emp.s’ Ret. Sys., 851 So. 2d 1100, 1107 (La. 2003) (discussing the vesting of pension rights and the
components of the states’ pension plans).
45. Bartlett, et al. v. Cameron, 316 P.3d 889, 896 (N.M. 2013) (“in the absence of any contradictory indication from our Legislature, any future cost-of-living-adjustment to a retirement benefit is
merely a year-to-year expectation that, until paid, does not create a property right under the Constitution.”).
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Much can be learned from Illinois and its largest municipality, Chicaregarding the connections between state and local governance, constitutional protection of pension rights, and tenable strategies to avoid fiscal
crisis. With unfunded pension deficits of approximately $111 billion,47
Illinois is experiencing fiscal distress of historic proportions. Substantial
financial difficulties plague Illinois’ state pension system and the four pension funds controlled by Chicago. 48 Facing mounting pressure from creditors and credit rating agencies, 49 the Illinois General Assembly passed
Public Act 098-0599 50 in 2014, which amended aspects of the state pension
code for current participants. 51 Public Act 098-0599 was also the focus of
the In re Pension Reform case, discussed in Parts III and IV.
Louisiana is suffering considerable pension challenges of its own. 52
According to one report, in 2013 the state’s unfunded pension liability togo, 46

46. Chicago with its estimated population 2,720,546 people in 2015 according to the Census
figures, substantially impacts the economic welfare of the entire state. Quick Facts, Chicago, Illinois,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last visited Dec. 19, 2016, 1:45 PM),
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/1714000 [https://perma.cc/8KP8-LS4X].
47. See Greg Hinz, There’s No Escape Illinois: It’s Time to Pay for Those Pensions, CRAIN’S
CHI.
BUS.
(Oct.
1,
2016),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20161001/ISSUE05/310019998?template=printart
[https://perma.cc/M89F-MJ43].
48. See also THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS: A WIDENING GAP IN CITIES, supra note 1 at 4, 14,
19, 21. (according 2009 figures, Chicago’s pensions were only 52% funded and in 2010 they were 47%
funded).
49. In 2014, Moody’s Investor Service lowered Chicago’s credit rating from A3 to Baa1.
Moody’s forewarned that the city’s bonds were headed for a junk status rating. See Moody’s Downgrade: Chicago’s Path Toward Junk (Mar. 15, 2014), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/moodysdowngrade-chicagos-path-toward-junk/ [https://perma.cc/NK3S-59BS]. In May 2015, Moody Investor’s issued a junk status rating for the city bonds. Everett Rosenfeld, Moody’s Downgrades Chicago
Debt
to
‘Junk’
with
Negative
Outlook,
CNBC
(May
12,
2015),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/12/moodys-downgrades-chicago-debt-to-junk-with-negativeoutlook.html [https://perma.cc/C3U7-VQYV].
50. 2014 Ill. Laws Pub. Act 98-599, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/98/098-0599.htm
[https://perma.cc/7WK5-93PH].
51. Although the law was scheduled to take effect on June 1, 2014, it did not due to the numerous
lawsuits that were filed challenging its validity. Chicago’s mayor, Rahm Emmanuel, also has made
several attempts to tackle the fiscal problems plaguing the municipality’s pension funds. These attempts
have been successfully challenged in court. See Mary J. Jones v. Municipal Employees’ Annuity and
Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2016 IL 119618, ¶61. Because the reasoning of the state supreme court
regarding the city’s funds follows that of the court’s decision in the state pension funds case, this paper
does not address the city fund decision in detail. While the case outcome is favorable for pensioners and
one that this paper endorses, one unfortunate downside to the court’s 2016 ruling striking down the
mayor’s plan is that it exacerbates the pension funding problem. Rather than the city paying the $90
million earmarked for the city pension funds into the funds, it is likely to be diverted elsewhere, until an
alternative plan is approved. This is an absurd result. If the city has $90 million available for pension
funds, it should invest the money accordingly, regardless of whether there is a modification plan in
place. See Dardick, supra note 43 (discussing the negative aspects of the court’s ruling).
52. See OWEN HAAGA ET AL., URBAN INST., THE STATE OF PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN
LOUISIANA 1 (June 2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/54231/2000267-ThePEW
State-of-Public-Pension-Reform-in-Louisiana.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZN2K-F2R6];
THE
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taled $74.9 billion. 53 In contrast to Illinois, Louisiana’s constitution-based
pension rights have been formulated to afford the state significant flexibility for addressing its budget shortfalls. As discussed in Parts III and IV,
there is often a tradeoff between structuring malleable plans that permit
legislators and governing officials to make adjustments where necessary for
sustainability and financial soundness and achieving plan integrity that
addresses the protection of public employees in their retirement. For that
reason, it is necessary to examine closely Louisiana’s constitutional language for any cautionary tales it provides to current and future state and
city employees and for lessons it can offer regarding good governance in
the design and administration of pension systems.
Commentators on the financial condition of Ohio’s pension funds offer conflicting assessments. Some reports opine that Ohio is experiencing
staggering shortfalls 54 while others conclude that the state’s pensions are
solvent and relatively stable. 55 The discrepancy may be explained in part
by the assumed level of return on pension investments. Ohio’s relevance to
this analysis is two-fold. First, because Ohio’s constitution does not include
provisions dedicated to protecting pension rights, instead relying upon a
statutory scheme for the regulation and administration of its pensions, the
CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THE STATE PENSIONS FUNDING GAP, supra note 1, at 3. See also Will Sentell,
(Dec.
17,
2012),
Report:
Teacher
Retirement
Underfunded,
ADVOCATE
http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/education/article_f1fe18fd-eca5-52c4-89a4e0f6b8e6ee69.html [https://perma.cc/6E9H-BW2N].
53. As one reporter characterized it, “[f]or every dollar in retirement benefits owed to state employees, Louisiana has just 31 cents in the kitty.” JR Ball, Louisiana Can No Longer Hide from the
Need to Reform Its State Retirement Systems, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 5, 2013),
http://www.nola.com/opinions/baton-rouge/index.ssf/2013/09/what_do_we_want_pension_reform.html
[https://perma.cc/M2ZN-DSPG] (citing Cory Eucalitto, State Budget Solutions, Promises Made, Promises Broken–The Betrayal of Pensioners and Taxpayers, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (Sept. 3, 2013),
https://www.alec.org/article/promises-made-promises-broken-the-betrayal-of-pensioners-and-taxpayers/
[https://perma.cc/YK5Q-9SHK]). See Joe Luppino-Esposito, Promises Made, Promises Broken 2014:
Unfunded Liabilities Hit $4.7 Trillion, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (Nov. 12, 2014),
https://www.alec.org/article/promises-made-promises-broken-2014-unfunded-liabilities-hit-4-7-trillion/
[https://perma.cc/RSB5-3XAU].
54. Maggie Thurber, Ohio’s unfunded pension liability more than $25K per resident,
OHIOWATCHDOG.ORG (Nov. 14, 2014) (citing to Luppino-Esposito, supra note 53),
http://watchdog.org/183105/ohio-pension-liability/ [https://perma.cc/TH5K-VLXU]. Thurber writes
that as of 2014, “Ohio’s public pension plans have so much debt that paying it off today would cost
each resident $25,080.” Id. Novy-Marx and Rauh’s 2008 assessment of Ohio’s pension debt was equally sobering. They concluded that: “At its current level [i.e. 2008[ of tax collection, Ohio would need to
devote 8.75 years of tax revenue to pension funding simply to catch-up on already made promises.”
Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 18, at 197.
55. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THE STATE PENSIONS FUNDING GAP, supra note 1, at 4.
See also MORNINGSTAR, THE STATE OF STATE PENSION PLANS 2013: A DEEP DIVE INTO SURPLUSES
AND SHORTFALLS 3 (2013),
http://images.mscomm.morningstar.com/Web/MorningstarInc/%7B43f240a0-4c8f-47b5-bc0145cbc9e9d33b%7D_StateofStatePensionsReport2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ADM-D9CJ].

2017]

THE PUBLIC PENSION CRISIS

405

Ohio case study makes for a valuable contrast to states that establish pension rights in their constitutions. Second, because courts have considered,
at times, a property-based approach in resolving cases concerning the pension rights of Ohio public employees, the state court decisions are useful
for contemplating whether conceptions of property are useful for establishing and preserving pension rights.
For the discussion of Michigan’s pensions, Detroit is the focal point.
Detroit represents the extreme because of its Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing on
July 18, 2013. 56 Having a municipality within the state of Michigan file for
bankruptcy places significant financial pressure on the state. Detroit’s filing
is noteworthy because it is “the largest municipal bankruptcy filing in history in terms of debt.” 57 At the time it declared bankruptcy, the city’s debt
level had reached a staggering $18 to $20 billion. 58 The bankruptcy was a
culmination of the disastrous economic trajectory the city had been on for
years. 59 The years prior to 2013 where characterized by the steady decline
of Detroit’s population, shrinking from a high of 1.8 million to 700,000.60
The Detroit of 2013 represents how municipalities can go spectacularly
wrong if they fail to develop responsible strategies for managing public
pension debt and fail to establish effective plans of fiscal and social governance.
Detroit is also relevant to this analysis because it foregrounds a highly
controversial issue: whether the federal government has a role in addressing the public pension crisis. In re City of Detroit, Michigan, sheds light on
the legal limits of public pension rights. In that case, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the state
constitution did not prohibit bankruptcy courts from modifying the municipality’s public pension obligations in the context of federal bankruptcy
proceedings. 61 While states are not permitted to file for bankruptcy, 62 mu56. City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT
MICHIGAN (July 18, 2013), http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/news/city-detroit-bankruptcy-filing
[https://perma.cc/YDE8-E4HN].
57. Monica Davey & Mary W. Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles Into Insolvency, N.Y.
(July
18,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-forTIMES
bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/R9PV-ZWLD].
58. Id. See Pete Saunders, Detroit After Bankruptcy, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/petesaunders1/2016/04/24/detroit-after-bankruptcy/#6b50e54e38e4.
59. Amy Padnani, Anatomy of Detroit’s Decline, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2013).
60. Davey & Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles into Insolvency, supra note 57.
61. The bankruptcy court reasoned that:

OF

the State of Michigan cannot legally provide for the adjustment of the pension debts of the
city of Detroit. This is a direct result of the prohibition against the State of Michigan impairing contracts in both the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution, as well as
the prohibition against impairing the contractual obligations relating to accrued pension bene-
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nicipalities, with the permission of their state can. 63 When a state authorizes a municipality to take this step, it impacts the overall financial condition
of the state.
III. THE ARTICULATION OF PENSION RIGHTS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
This section examines certain constitutions and statutes to understand
how states have articulated pension rights for public employees. Provisions
regarding substantive pension benefits, the funding of plans, and the administration of the plan are contained in the various pension statutes and
codes of each state. 64 Drawing upon their state constitutions or statutes,
public employees have presented arguments sounding in the law of contracts, property, and due process. 65 Illinois is an appropriate beginning
point for this discussion because the state is facing formidable budget challenges due in large measure to its pension deficits, but also because of sections within the state constitution related to public pensions. The most
significant of these constitutional provisions is known as the Pension Protection Clause. The clause, which is contained in Article XIII, § 5, did
nothing less than create a new right. 66 In fact, this is exactly how the Illinois Supreme Court in its 2015 decision, In re Pension Reform Litigation,
characterized it. 67 The pension protection clause provides that
“[m]embership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of
local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which
fits in the Michigan Constitution. The federal bankruptcy court, however, is not so constrained.
In re City of Detroit, Michigan, 504 B.R. 90, 150 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
62. States are precluded from filing for bankruptcy by the federal bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C.A.
§109, and the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
63. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 40, at 12.
64. See e.g., 40 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 et seq. (Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-930 of 2016
Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §38.551 et seq. (Westlaw through Pub. Act 2016 No. 563 of
2016 Reg. Sess.) (Firefighters and Police Officers Retirement Act); LA. STAT. ANN. § 11:1 et seq.
(Westlaw through 2016 First Extraordinary, Reg., and Second Extraordinary Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3307.01 et seq. (Westlaw through 2015–2016 Leg. Sess.) (State Teacher’s Retirement System).
65. See In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶62; Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL
115811, ¶22; Smith v. Bd. of Tr. of Louisiana State Emp.s’ Ret. Sys., 851 So. 2d 1100, 1105–06 (La.
2003); In re City of Detroit, Michigan, 504 B.R. 97, 137 (E.D. Mich. 2013);
66. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded with respect to the Article XIII, section 5 that “[t]hose
provisions not only created a new right of constitutional dimension, conferring enforceable contractual
status on the benefits of membership in public retirement systems, they also defined the scope of protections afforded such benefits.” In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶¶70–71.
67. Id.
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shall not be diminished or impaired.” 68 The Illinois legislature approved
adding the aforementioned language to the 1970 constitution by a vote of
fifty-seven to thirty-six. 69 The goal was to insulate Illinois pensions from
the political maneuvering that made them vulnerable to modification without obtaining the consent of the affected groups (i.e. public school teachers,
firefighters, police officers, and other government employees).
Prior to the adoption of the law, Illinois had received repeated warnings from the Securities Exchange Commission, the Illinois Public Employees Pension Laws Commission, 70 financial consultants, crediting
agencies, and creditors that its practices regarding the chronic underfunding
of its pensions were reckless and unsound. 71 For years, Illinois politicians
refused to heed the advice recommending that they take proper action and
make the necessary appropriations to fund the pensions. 72 In essence, government officials were sending the message that, if the pensions needed to
be sacrificed, they would sacrifice them. 73 So, when the delegates met for
the 1970 constitutional convention, they designed a provision to protect
public employees from the political games that consistently threatened their
retirement interests. Illinois based its pension clause on similar language in
New York’s 1938 constitution. 74 Not only did the state supporters of the
provision seek to protect pensioners, they also sought to motivate the legislature to address the pension fund shortfalls in a timely manner. Despite the
latter objective, the Pension Clause has thus far failed to incentivize the
state to make the yearly appropriations necessary to close the gap between
pension assets and liabilities. 75 Now—some forty-six years later—Illinois
will have to develop multiple, creative solutions to ameliorate the problem.
There are three key features to highlight about Illinois’ pension clause.
First, it is a separate provision dedicated towards the protection of pension
rights. The significance of having a separate clause for this purpose will be
68. IL CONST. art. XIII, § 5.
69. Bob Sector & Rick Pearson, Pension Debate at 1970 Convention Echoes in Today’s Crisis,
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-met-public-pensions-197020130923-story.html.
70. In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 11858, ¶¶11–14.
71. Id. See Sector & Pearson, supra note 69.
72. The conventional recommendation is that when money has been set aside through investments to cover at least eighty percent of the outstanding pensions obligations, the funding is at a financially sound level. See Christensen & Moore, supra note 19, at 35 (noting the industry standard but
questioning its soundness).
73. See Ann Lousin, The 1970 Illinois Constitution: Has it Made a Difference?, 8 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 571,
605–06 (1988) (discussing the origins of the pension clause and cases concerning it).
74. Sector and Pearson, supra note 69.
75. Id.
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apparent in the analysis comparing the laws of Louisiana, Ohio, and Michigan in Part IV. Second, Illinois’ provision enshrined a new right in that it
recognized a contractual relationship between the government 76 and public
employees that may be mutually enforced. 77 Prior to this, pensions were
treated as gratuities. 78 Consequently, the state and related government entities had the power to modify, revoke, and deny benefits at their discretion. 79 Establishing the existence of a contractual right immediately confers
advantages and places limitations on the bound parties. Third, the declaration that pension benefits may not be “diminished or impaired” preserves
the contractual bargain that was struck between public employer and employee at the time the employee was hired. The fact that there is a provision
combining all these elements gives the clause its strength.
The Illinois Constitution’s Contracts Clause is another provision that
public employees have relied upon to guard against modifications to their
plans. The clause is an ex post facto prohibition like the one contained in
the federal constitution. 80 Illinois’ Contracts Clause provides that “No ex
post facto law, or law impairing contracts or making an irrevocable grant of
special privileges or immunities, shall be passed.” 81 In past cases, state
employees within Illinois’ system have framed their claims in terms of the
state’s contracts clause to argue that any attempts by the state to alter the
base benefits in their plans (measured at the time they entered employment)
or that are designed to decrease or eliminate the cost of living adjustments
or health coverage associated with their benefits packages, infringed upon
their contractual rights. 82 Illinois pensioners have also resorted to the state
constitution’s takings clause to argue that any change to benefits plans
would constitute an unlawful taking without just compensation. The takings clause provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation as provided by law. Such compensation shall be determined by a jury as provided by law.” 83 For the reasons discussed in Part IV, out of the three main arguments grounded in the
76. The term government is meant in the inclusive sense of all its associated entities.
77. In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶72.
78. Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶45.
79. Id. (“Where an employee’s participation in a pension plan was mandatory, the rights created
in the relationship were considered to be in the nature of a gratuity that could be revoked at will.”).
80. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: that
“No state shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing or Law impairing
the Obligations of Contracts . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
81. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
82. See In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶38–40; Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶22
(relying upon the state’s contracts clause).
83. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
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state constitution, Illinois courts have rendered decisions in favor of public
pensioners based upon the Pension Protection Clause.
Alongside Illinois, Louisiana shares a special constitutional provision
dedicated to preserving pension rights. Its language, found in Article X, §
29(E)(5), provides in relevant part:
The accrued benefits of members of any state or statewide retirement
system shall not be diminished or impaired. Future benefit provisions of
the state and statewide public retirement systems shall only be altered by
legislative enactment. 84

Louisiana’s legislature added this provision in 1987, relatively late
compared to the adoption of Illinois’ and Michigan’s clauses. While the
Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that the pension clause grants some
protection, public workers whose benefits have been threatened have not
met with the same success as participants in Illinois in preventing the erosion of their plan benefits. 85 The difference in treatment, as discussed in
Part IV, is due in large measure to how the right was constructed.
Two other relevant sections under Article X that pertain to pension
rights are sections 29(A) 86 and 29(B). Both establish that membership in
Louisiana’s retirement system constitutes a contractual relationship. 87 For
example, Section 29(B) recognizes that membership in the state retirement
systems “shall be a contractual relationship between employee and employer” and that “the state shall guarantee benefits payable to a member . . .
or retiree or to his lawful beneficiary.” 88
Like the United States Constitution and that of Illinois’, Louisiana’s
constitution contains a contracts clause prohibiting the adoption of an “ex
post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.” 89 Despite its
proscriptions, arguments that this provision precludes changes to retirement
benefits packages once the employee commences work have been unsuccessful. 90 In connection with asserting property-based arguments, pensioners in Louisiana have relied upon the constitution’s due process provision
to argue that proposed adjustments to their benefits violate the restriction
prohibiting states from depriving individuals of their property “except by
due process of law.” 91 Actuarially sound mandates are another avenue by
84.
85.
2003).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

LA. CONST. art. X, § 29(E)(5) (“added pursuant to Act 947 of the 1987 Regular Session”).
See e.g., Smith v. Bd. of Tr. of Louisiana State Emp.s’ Ret. Sys., 851 So.2d 1100, 1111 (La.
Section 29(A) applies to public school teachers. LA. CONST. art. X, § 29(A).
Id. § 29.
Id. § 29(B).
Id. art. I, § 23.
See e.g., Smith v. Bd. of Tr. of Louisiana State Emp.s’ Ret. Sys., 851 So. 2d 1100, 1108–10.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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which Louisiana has sought to constitutionally protect pensions. 92 The
logic informing such directives is that if pension funds are fiscally sound,
then governments will be able to pay retirement benefits as they become
due. This is one interpretation of actuarial directives. Another view is that
actuarially sound provisions are not protective of pension rights, but instead
render them more vulnerable because this type of language places pressure
on legislatures to revise pension plans to meet whatever requirements are
imposed.
In contrast to Illinois, Louisiana, and Michigan, Ohio’s constitution
does not contain an express provision dedicated to the protection of public
pension rights. Rather, statutory law governs the state’s pensions. 93 In
2015, Ohio had eight public pensions; seven are administered by the state,
and one is under local control. 94 Some of the significant rulings regarding
Ohio’s pensions have concerned the State Teachers Retirement System
(“STRS”). 95 This paper analyzes the Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation
of key sections of STRS statutes to gain a sense of whether they offer plan
participants any protection from subsequent benefits changes. The relevant
statutory provisions for STRS are contained in Chapter 3307 of Ohio’s
Revised Code. 96 For purposes of this discussion, the essential statutory
provisions are the STRS vesting rights statute, 97 and R.C. § 3307.03, which
establishes that retirement funds are “statutory benefits.” 98
92. Louisiana constitution’s Article X, §29(E) requires that “the actuarial soundness of state and
statewide retirement systems shall be attained and maintained and the legislature shall establish by law,
for each state or statewide retirement system, the particular method of actuarial valuation to be employed.” LA. CONST. art. X, § 29(E).
93. See State ex rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Retirement Board, 697 N.E.2d 644, 647 (Ohio
2007) (“Public school teachers do not possess contract rights in any State Teachers Retirement System
benefit unless and until the benefit vests by operation of R.C. 3307.711”). See also Herrick v. Lindley,
391 N.E.2d 729, 732–33 (Ohio 1979) (“retirees have a vested right to receive a retirement allowance or
similar benefit at the rate fixed by law when such benefit was conferred.”).
94. State and Locally-Administered Defined Benefit Pension Systems – All Data by State and
Level of Government: 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk
[https://perma.cc/J4D7-ZYMF] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
95. Horvath, 697 N.E.2d 644; Herrick, 391 N.E.2d 729.
96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307 et seq. (Westlaw through 2015–2016 Leg. Sess.) Individuals
who become members of STRS are permitted to choose whether to participate in the defined benefit
plan or the defined contribution plan. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.25 (Westlaw through 2015–2016
Leg. Sess.) This discussion is concerned with the defined benefit plan.
97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.711 (1955). The Horvath court concluded that: “By its terms
R.C. 3307.711 vests a right to a retirement allowance, annuity, or pension at the time that benefit is
granted by the STRB at the rate fixed by law when the benefit is conferred.” 697 N.E.2d at 654.
98. See Horvath, 697 N.E.2d at 652 (“Grants made from STRS funds, including refunds drawn
from the teachers’ savings fund pursuant to R.C. 3307.48(B) and 3307.46, constitute statutory benefits.”) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.03). § 3307.03 provides in relevant part:
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When public employees in Ohio have sought constitutional protection
from changes in their pension plans, they have relied upon the takings 99
and contracts clauses. 100 The Supreme Court of Ohio’s treatment of a public pensions takings claim in the Horvath case offers valuable insight concerning the strength of this argument and the analysis that courts are likely
to apply. Regarding Ohio’s contracts clause, the provision affords scant
protection especially in view of the state’s statutory scheme. Ohio’s decision not to incorporate constitutional language dedicated to carving out and
preserving pension rights, translates into substantive differences regarding
the status of their pensions for public sector workers.
Michigan, like Illinois and Louisiana, has a special constitutional provision, which defines pension rights. Article IX, § 24 of Michigan’s constitution provides:
The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.
Financial benefits arising on account of service rendered in each fiscal
year shall be funded during that year and such funding shall not be used
for financing unfunded accrued liabilities. 101

This provision along with Michigan’s Contracts Clause 102 have been
invoked most recently in the context of Detroit’s monumental municipal
bankruptcy filing in 2013. For the reasons discussed below, the structuring
of this clause renders pension benefits vulnerable to certain actions of the
state or municipality in addressing fiscal matters. Nonetheless, it is better
for plan participants to have a special clause devoted to the recognition and
A state teachers’ retirement system is hereby established for the teachers of the public schools of the
state which includes the several funds created and placed under the management of a state teachers
retirement board for the payment of retirement allowances and other benefits under Chapter 3307 of the
Revised Code . . . All of its business shall be transacted, and all of its funds invested, all warrants for
money drawn and payments made, and all of its cash, securities, and other property shall be held in the
name of the board or in the name of its nominee . . . .
Id.
99. OH. CONST. art. I, §19.
100. The Contracts Clause is contained in Article II Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. The
clause provides:
The general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing the obligation of
contract; but may by general laws, authorize courts to carry into effect, upon such terms as shall be just
and equitable, the manifest intention of parties, officers by curing omissions, defects, and errors, in
instruments and proceedings, arising out of conformity with the laws of this state.
OH. CONST. art. II, §28.
101. Michigan adopted this provision as part of the state’s 1963 Constitution. MI. CONST. art. IX,
§24.
102. MI. CONST. art. I, §10 (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation
of contract shall be enacted.”).
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preservation of their rights than not. Bankruptcy, however, presents particular challenges to this provision’s efficacy in guarding pension rights
from ex post facto modifications.
IV. “FOR THE GOOD OF PEOPLE”—ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONALLY-GROUNDED LEGAL ARGUMENTS TO PRESERVE AND
CHALLENGE PENSION RIGHTS
This section considers how the formulation of rights, the vehicle
through which they are stated, and judicial interpretation translate into significant differences concerning the power of public workers to insulate
their retirement benefits from economic and political shifts. It also further
explicates how public pension obligations relate to states and cities in crisis. While some jurisdictions may be drastically overstating the proportions
of their pension crisis, 103 this paper shares Jack Beermann’s assessment that
there is ample evidence to support the conclusion that there are serious
fiscal issues confronting many regions across the nation. 104 Therefore, pension reform is warranted. However, unlike some scholars and policy officials who are pressing for revisions that will negatively impact current
public employees and retirees by contracting their benefits, with one important exception, the recommendations for reform advanced herein, are
prospective in nature. The exception concerns the recommendation, that
where constitutional pension protections are lacking, legislatures should
adopt provisions to shore up the rights of pension-holders in the interests of
long-term governmental stability. The coverage that the new amendment
provides should pertain to current pensioners and new employees. Examining the pension laws of various states from the vantage point of public
workers is useful for identifying approaches that should prove beneficial in
the future design of pension plans and for managing the present crisis.
A. The Sovereign’s Police Powers and Distinctions Between Pension
Protection Clauses and Contracts Clauses in State Constitutions
The primary constitutional source of protection for public pensions in
Illinois is the Pension Protection Clause. The court’s ruling in In re Pension
Reform reinforced its effectiveness in guarding pension rights. Its powerful

103. See Patrick Yeagle, The Manufactured Crisis over Illinois Pensions, ILL. TIMES (Apr. 25,
2013),
http://illinoistimes.com/article-11300-the-manufactured-crisis-over-illinois-pensions.html
[https://perma.cc/6FYT-DTNK]. See also Saqib Bhatti and Carrie Sloan, OUR KIND OF TOWN, supra
note .
104. Jack Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 10–16 (2013).
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effect could not even be overcome by the presumption of validity that
courts normally extend to legislative statutes. 105 At issue in In re Pension
Reform was the validity of Public Act 98-599, a new law that modified the
Illinois Pension Code 106 by revising the benefits to which certain retirement
system members were entitled. 107 The key contentious aspects of the law
involved changes:
which would reduce the retirement annuities of individuals entitled to
Tier 1 benefits by raising the age at which members under the age of 46
are eligible to begin receiving their retirement annuities, capping the
maximum salary that may be considered when calculating the amount of
member’s retirement annuity, abolishing the existing fixed 3% annual
annuity increases, eliminating at least one and up to five annual annuity
increases under the new formula, and altering how the base annuity
amount is determined for purposes of the ‘money purchase’ formula. 108

There was a lot at stake in this case. Even though there were other
strategies to address the state’s pension deficits and mounting pension obligations, government officials proposed a solution that solely burdened retirement plan participants. 109
105. The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned:
While we presume statutes to be constitutional and must construe enactments by the legislature so as to uphold their validity whenever it is reasonably proper to do so [], there is simply
no way that the annuity reduction provisions in Public Act 98-599 can be reconciled with the
rights and protections established by the people of Illinois when they ratified the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and its pension protection clause . . . The General Assembly overstepped
the scope of its legislative power. The court is therefore obligated to declare those provisions invalid.
In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶47 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
106. Illinois Pension Code, 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2012).
107. In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶1.
108. Id. ¶ 34.
109. The court in In re Pension Reform Litigation took note of the exchange between Illinois
senators’ discussions that made it apparent that downsizing pension obligations was the quick fix to the
debt problem. It is worth highlighting part of the exchange, in which Senator Hutchinson and Senator
Raoul, respectively stated:
SENATOR HUTCHINGSON:
Would another alternative be the proposal that the Center for Tax and Budget Accountability
outlined before the conference committee, which would have re-amortized the current unfunded liabilities to a new gradual [level] dollar payment schedule to achieve well over eighty
percent by 2059?
SENATOR RAOUL:
Yes. So that - that and many other things could have been possible alternatives.
SENATOR HUTCHINGSON:
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The Illinois Supreme Court’s holding that Article XIII, § 5 confers
protection on a public employee’s retirement benefits at the commencement of his employment relationship, rather than when he retires, 110 and
that his interest in the retirement benefits attaches immediately, 111 was a
coup for Illinois’ public-sector workers. The clause explicitly recognizes an
enforceable contractual relationship. 112 For labor union members and other
government employees, the ruling was particularly gratifying given their
view that, “‘[p]oliticians caused the pension debt by failing to set aside
adequate contributions, in effect borrowing from future retirees to avoid
raising revenue or cutting spending instead.’”113 The decision signals to the
legislature and other state government officials that they will not be permitted to manipulate pensions to balance the budget. The broad sweeping language of Illinois’ pension clause, which encompasses members “in any
pension or retirement System of the State, any unit of local government or
school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof,” 114 confers widespread protection.
Illinois’ protection coverage for benefits is also broad in the sense of
what is included as a “benefit,” as the court’s interpretation of that same
constitutional pension provision in an earlier case made clear. In Kanerva
v. Weems, 115 Illinois’ high court concluded that it doesn’t matter that the
type of benefit at issue may be subject to a different calculation from other
benefits. Instead, it is the “status” that is decisive. If the benefit “is derived
[The last sentence of the fourth paragraph of the report contains the phrase] that the legislation is ‘minimizing the impact on current and retired State employees’. So by using ‘minimizing’, does that mean that the legislation is somehow the least restrictive means available to
us?
SENATOR RAOUL:
Yeah, I—you know—I don’t know what the least restrictive means are. I—I think what we’re
doing just reflects what the political climate is. Again, I’ve—I’ve—I’ve said, time and again,
that we’ve been cemented in a stalemate, and I, for my part, don’t want to see the State sink
as a result of that stalemate. So, it may not be the least restrictive means, but the political climate, I believe, allows for us to—to take the step that we’re ZH’re hopefully now taking.
Id. ¶ 34 (quoting 98th Ill. Gen. Assembly, Senate Proceedings, Dec. 3, 2013, at 41–46 (statements of
Senators Hutchinson and Raoul)).
110. Id. ¶ 45.
111. Id. ¶ 34.
112. The Pension Clause declares, “Membership in any pension or retirement system of the
State . . . shall be an enforceable contractual relationship . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
113. Dardick, supra note 51 (quoting a representative of the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees Council 31, the Chicago Teachers Union, the Illinois Nurses Association,
and Teamsters Local 700).
114. ILL. CONST. art. 13, §5.
115. 2014 IL 115811.
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from membership in one of the State’s public pension systems . . . it is protected.” 116 This means that not only are calculations based upon salary
shielded under the pension clause’s umbrella, but so are cost of living adjustments and health insurance. Often, when policymakers target the
aforementioned benefits for cuts, they discuss the items as though they are
merely supplemental; meaning that, they are not essential to the quality of
life and maintenance of retirees. This mischaracterization is far from the
truth. The failure to cast a wide, inclusive net when using the term “benefits” could mean that the fixed income savings of retirees are consumed by
inflation or astronomical health care costs. If COLAs and health care were
part of the original compensation offered at the time of hiring, then government officials should not be allowed to excise these items from the paid
benefits retirees receive. The Illinois Pension Reform case supports this
logic.
As a follow-up to arguments couched in the Pension Protection
Clause, members of the plans often resort to the contracts clauses in their
state’s constitution, to assert that the legislature is forbidden to adopt ex
post facto laws that impair contracts. While clauses of this type afford some
protection, without more, they often prove inadequate to stave off legislative attacks on pension rights. The reasons are several-fold. First, the contracts clauses do not expressly recognize the relationship between the
government and public employees as a contractual arrangement. To bestow
the rights, privileges, and mutual obligations that a contract gives rise to,
there needs to be a separate constitutional provision or statute recognizing
that a contract exists. Preferably, such provision should also specify when
the contract is formed. Second, contracts protected solely by the contracts
clause are, arguably, more vulnerable 117 to the state’s exercise of its police
powers. 118
In re Pension Reform illustrates the difference that having a special
provision dedicated to pension protection can make. The case supports the

116. Id. ¶ 54.
117. The Illinois supreme court and the bankruptcy court in the In re Detroit, Michigan case have
expressed different opinions on whether the respective state’s pension protection clauses afford more
protection than the contracts clauses. Cf. In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585 ¶¶37–38
(recognizing that contracts protected solely under the contracts clause may be overcome by the sovereign police powers in some instances but noting that where the impairment is substantial it is subject to
more intense scrutiny and will likely be invalidated).
118. In comparing the Contracts Clause in the United States Constitution to the one in Louisiana’s
constitution, Louisiana’s State Supreme Court concluded that “[a]lthough the language of each clause is
facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the state to
safeguard the vital interests of its people.” Segura v. Frank, 630 So.2d 714, 728 (La. 1994) (citations
omitted).
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proposition that pension contracts protected by special clauses structured
like Illinois’ are not subject to the state’s sovereign police powers 119
whereas contracts clauses are susceptible to such state action.
There, the state asserted its right to exercise its sovereign police powers as a defense to its constitution’s pension clause. 120 The state argued that
even if the pension clause applies, it doesn’t grant any more protection than
the contracts clause in times of crisis. 121 Rather than being absolute, the
pension clause is subject to the state’s police powers just as contracts under
the contracts clause were fettered. 122 Consequently, when facing extreme
emergencies, the state can exercise its police powers and infringe upon
pension rights for the good of the state (and its cities) to protect the safety,
health, welfare, and morals of the populace. 123
The court’s holding is remarkable because police powers arguments
regarding the prevailing interest in the well-being of populace can be seductive. For the court not to succumb to them and, instead, uphold the pensioners’ interests is significant. The decision addressed the power
imbalance between public employers and employees in the area of compensation. Not only did it reflect the court’s adherence to the objectives of
the pension clause—as expressed by the delegates to the Illinois’ 1970
constitutional convention to above all else preserve pensioners’ benefits 124—it also is a moment in which the Court discerned the “voice” of the
119. Id. at 24. The court reasoned that:
Given the history of article XIII, section 5, and the language that was ultimately adopted, we
therefore have no possible basis for interpreting the provision to mean that its protections can
be overridden if the General Assembly deems it appropriate, as it sometimes can be under the
contracts clause.
Id.
120. In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 11858532, ¶¶72–75.
121. Brief for Defendant-Appellants at *21–27, In re Pension Reform Litigation, cite for brief
2015 WL 1378612 (2015).
122. Essentially, the government argued that there was nothing in the pension clause to suggest
that it would not be subject to the reserved sovereign police powers of the state. Brief for DefendantAppellants, supra note 121, at *16.
123. In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 11858532, ¶¶33–37, ¶¶47–52, ¶¶60–65. See Brief
for Defendant-Appellants, supra note 121, at *4.
124. The court was clearly influenced by the comments of convention delegates as is evident from
its citations to the Record of the Proceedings for the constitutional convention:
Subsequent comments by other delegates reaffirmed that the provision was designed to confer
contractual protection on the benefits of membership in public retirement systems and afford
beneficiaries, pensioners or their dependents ‘a basic protection against abolishing their rights
completely or changing the terms of their rights after they have embarked upon the employment to lessen them.’
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people and viewed it as being at odds with the legislature’s claims to represent the public interest. 125 The state argued that the fiscal pressures of the
Great Recession had devastated the financial condition of the state. 126 Significant decreases in the value of the investments of the pension funds
made it challenging, if not impossible, for Illinois to both meet its debt
obligations to creditors in a timely manner and to provide services such as
public education, police and fire protection, waste collection, and infrastructure maintenance. 127 Reducing the outstanding pension liabilities was
one way to manage the debt, allowing for the savings to be redirected to
critical services. The state’s arguments invited the court to reweigh whether
public employees deserved the compensation they were promised against a
host of hypothetical disasters such as, closing public “prisons and schools”
or not being able to “purchase and distribute vaccines” in the wake of a
health crisis. 128
The state, however, was presenting the court with a false dilemma.
Rather than treating pension funds as discretionary assets that may be reallocated towards dire services, they should be viewed as deferred compensation. If the government wasn’t comfortable with the level of compensation
offered to public employees, it should have made ex-ante changes to the
benefits packages. The plausibility of some of the predictions on the state’s
list of horribles (e.g., further reductions in credit ratings) should not change
the fact that the government has pension obligations that it must satisfy.
The state’s doomsday list does not justify placing the burden more heavily
on public employees. Instead, local and state governments should rely upon
more equitable burden-sharing mechanisms, such as increasing individual
income taxes or imposing taxes on corporations. While these solutions also
have potential downsides with respect to their impact on the ability of juIn re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶¶15–18 (citing and quoting Kanerva v. Weems,
2014 IL 115811 at ¶46, quoting 4 Record of Proceedings 2925 statements of Delegate Kinney) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
125. The Court reasoned:
“The people of Illinois give voice to their sovereign authority through the Illinois Constitution . . . Through [the Pension Protection Clause] the people of Illinois yielded none of their
sovereign authority. They simply withheld an important part of it from the legislature, because they believed, based on historical experience, that when it came to retirement benefits
for public employees, the legislature could not be trusted with more.”
In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶¶ 75–82.
126. Brief for Defendant-Appellants, supra note 121 at *6–8. See In re Pension Reform Litigation,
2015 IL 118585, ¶¶ 58–59.
127. Brief for Defendant-Appellants, supra note 121, *6–7, *12–13.
128. Brief for Defendant-Appellants, supra note 121, at *20.
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risdictions to attract and retain companies and human capital, 129 arguably,
they are likely to result in less political and economic costs than a municipality or state reneging on the payment of its pension obligations.
If the court had accepted the government’s argument, the contested
law (i.e. Public Act 98-599) would have been subjected to a rational basis
standard of review. 130 In accordance with this standard, if the state could
show that the law was “reasonable and necessary to serve an important
public purpose” it would survive the court’s scrutiny. 131 This deferential
standard is a very low threshold to satisfy. Adopting this level of judicial
review would render, as the court concluded, the Pension Protection Clause
ineffectual and meaningless. 132 The court’s allowance of the police power
as a defense would be akin to declaring that public employees have pension
benefits until the state decides they do not. In other words, it would contravene the main goal of the Pension Protection Clause, which was to change
the status of pension benefits from gratuities into enforceable contractual
obligations.
The Illinois Supreme Court distinguished between the Pension Protection Clause and the Contracts Clause, 133 noting the differences in the former’s import and effect. 134 In so ruling, it rejected the rational basis test.
129. Pozen & Khuruna, supra note 27, at 8 (discussing negative consequences of raising taxes to
cover pension debt). See generally Anderson, supra note 15 (identifying some of the consequences
associated with governments’ fiscal decisions to impose higher taxes to address debt obligations).
130. In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶62 (“impairment of a contract may survive strict scrutiny under the contracts clause if reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose . . . .”).
131. Id.
132. Id. ¶ 75.
133. The court concluded that the state could not “resort to the contracts clause to support its
police powers argument” that pension contracts, like other contracts, can be modified in times of emergency to serve the public safety, health, general welfare, and morals. Id. ¶ 69.
134. The court reasoned:
The contracts clause had antecedents in the very first Illinois Constitution and in the Constitution of the United States. When the time came to address the protection for
public pensions, the drafters of the 1970 Constitution therefore presumably knew of
the substantial body of case law involving that clause, including the case law holding
that, when warranted, the protections afforded contracts could be modified through
the exercise of the state’s police powers. That, however is not the standard they chose with respect to the benefits of membership in public pension systems . . . When it came time to address the rights conferred by membership in public pension systems, however, the drafters
included no similar reservation of authority . . . That proposal [] was rejected in favor of the
separate, more specific provision of article XIII, section 5.
Id. ¶ 70. One interesting aside is the court’s observation that prior to the adoption of the pension clause,
when the court assessed the constitutional validity of legislation that impinged on public pension rights
under the rational basis scrutiny standard utilized for matters falling under the contracts clause, it struck
down such legislation. Id. ¶ 61 (“When the legislation has been directed at reducing pension benefits of
State employees, this court has expressly held that it is ‘not defensible as a reasonable exercise of the
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Drawing upon United States Supreme Court precedent, the court proposed
an alternative scheme to evaluate the constitutional validity of the pension
reform legislation. 135 Under this new framework, the “necessity” element
was the focal point. Where the state seeks to modify a contract, concerning
its financial interest, to which it is a party and the state argues that the contested legal measure is reasonable and necessary for the good of the public
as whole, the court must examine: 1) Whether the “effects” of the constitutional provisions the new law overrides “were unforeseen and unintended
by the legislature when initially adopted” and 2) “Whether the state could
achieve its purposes through less drastic measures.” 136 Based upon this
analysis, the court invalidated the state’s modification plan.
The test enabled the court to address one of its primary concerns regarding equity in contractual relations. In this instance, the state was seeking to unilaterally modify a contract that it was a party to for its own
advantage. 137 The state’s actions exemplify the problem with treating pension benefits as gratuities rather than deferred compensation. The bargaining power between parties is unequal if governments are permitted to
disregard the terms it presented to job candidates as enticements for them
to accept the offer of employment. One way to restore equity in the employer-employee relationship and to discipline governments in terms of
their expenditures is to make it more difficult for them to adopt the expedient choice of shortchanging the retirement benefits of public employees.
This can be done through the state constitution 138 and, to some extent,
through the judiciary. The goal is to motivate government officials and

State’s police powers’ and declared it invalid under the contracts clause, as well as for other reasons.”)
(citations omitted). The court’s actions suggest that it recognized that pensions should have a special
status even before sufficient political forces were galvanized to adopt constitutional protection for them.
135. Id. ¶ 65.
136. Id.
137. The Illinois court reasoned that:
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that particular scrutiny of legislative action is warranted when, as here, a state seeks to impair a contract to which it is itself a party
and its interests in avoiding the contract or changing its terms is financial . . . In addition, because the state’s self-interest is at stake whenever it seeks to modify its own financial obligations, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that it is not appropriate to give the
state’s legislature the same deference it would otherwise be afforded with regard to whether
the impairment is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.
Id. ¶¶63–64.
138. The Illinois Supreme Court commented on the power of constitutions relative to the legislature: “Where rights have been conferred and limits on governmental action have been defined by the
people through the constitution, the legislature cannot enact legislation in contravention of those rights
and restrictions.” Id. ¶ 79.
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legislators to find solutions that more fairly “distribute the burdens evenly
among Illinoisans.” 139
Richard Briffault comments that one rationale offered for constitutionalizing fiscal restraints is that it removes those matters from the “dayto-day control of the political process” and instead embeds them in the
“fundamental structure of the states.” 140 He concludes, however, that this
strategy did not work regarding the imposition of constitutional spending
limits and other budgetary constraints. 141 This paper contends that the foregoing approach holds more promise for pension rights. A strong constitutional provision dedicated to delineating and preserving pension rights will
place roadblocks in the way of political representatives who repeatedly
choose to sacrifice pensions in lieu of taking more politically controversial
actions, such as raising taxes. If courts are willing to subject legislation that
threatens pension benefits to a more demanding level of scrutiny, it should
alter political behavior in that it forecloses the option of welching on pension promises to reduce pension debt. By signaling that they are unwilling
to be deferential towards eleventh-hour legislation and police powers justifications, courts can place the burden on municipalities and states to find
better solutions that do not immediately penalize pensioners.
In the Louisiana and Ohio cases examined herein, the arguments
sounding in contract law clause were structured in a different way. The
cases showcase the unsuccessful strategies of plan members who relied
upon the contracts clause in their state’s constitution as a foil to thwart
legislative adjustments to their pension benefits. The Smith v. Board of
Trustees of Louisiana Employees’ Retirement System case dealt with Louisiana’s State Employees Retirement System (“LASERS”). State employees
brought suit relying upon arguments grounded in constitutional contractsbased provisions 142 and a civil code provision proscribing retroactive
laws. 143 They asserted that, because the impact of the contested law was to
revoke retirement benefits that were available to them at the time they were
139. Id. ¶ 69.
140. Briffault, supra note 10, at 944.
141. Briffault concludes that “There is an enormous gap between the written provisions of state
constitutions and actual practice. State legislatures and local governments have repeatedly sought to
expand the ‘public purpose’ and to slip the restraints of the tax and debt limits.” Briffault, supra note
10, at 909 (footnotes omitted).
142. The Contracts Clause is contained in Article I § 23 of the Louisiana constitution. The other
contracts provision pertains to pensions and is contained in Article X § 29. The plaintiffs also relied
upon the federal contracts clause. For purposes of this analysis, however, the focus is on the state
constitution. See LA CONST. art. I, § 23; id. art. X, § 29
143. LA. C.C. art 6 (“In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply
prospectively only.”).
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rehired, and replace those benefits with lesser options, the law impermissibly impaired their contracts with the state 144 and was retroactive. The court
viewed the contracts clause argument as secondary to the vesting issue.
From the court’s perspective, there could be no impairment operating retroactively unless the challenged legal measure “modifie[d] or suppresse[d]
the effects of a right already acquired.” 145 Thus, the key issue was whether
public employees who had not yet retired could claim to have legally enforceable rights in their pension benefits. 146
The essential contract provision that the Smith plaintiffs drew upon
was in the article governing pension benefits. Article X, Section 29(B) of
the Louisiana constitution establishes that the relationship between public
employers and employees is a contractual one. 147 With respect to this relationship, however, Louisiana’s Supreme Court took a strikingly different
approach from that of Illinois. The Smith court concluded that the contract
is formed only when the employee has fulfilled the requisites of the employment relationship by qualifying for retirement. 148 In contrast, Illinois
recognizes that the contract is formed and, therefore, rights attach, at the
start of the employment relationship. Because the Smith court determined
that the pension contract provision of Section 29(B) only pertains to retirement benefits that are vested, 149 and the plaintiffs in Smith were concerned
about benefits for which they had not yet met the age and service requirements, the new law that revised the benefits available did not violate the
contracts clause. 150
144. Smith v. Bd. of Tr. of Louisiana State Emp.s’ Ret. Sys., 851 So. 2d 1100, 1105–06 (La.
2003).
145. Id. at 1106 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 1109.
147. LA. CONST. art. X, § 29.
148. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1108–09. The Smith court concludes: “Upon their retirement, plaintiffs
had a contract with the state for those retirement benefits that were vested.” Id. at 1109.
149. The Smith court reasoned that “although La. Const. Art. X, §29(B) expressly states that
membership in LASERS creates a ‘contractual relationship,’ this constitutional provision serves to
expressly recognize the existence of a contract between the state and employee as to those retirement
benefits that are vested.” Id. at 1109.
150. Id. at 1110 (“As we have found that the plaintiffs have not met their burden under part one of
the Contracts Clause analysis that the statute impaired a contractual obligation, our Contract Clause
analysis is at an end.”). The Smith court identifies the four-part test that should be applied for evaluating
whether there is a violation of the contracts clause:
(i) whether the law impairs a contractual relationship, (ii) whether the constitution is implicated by the impairment, (iii) ‘whether a significant and legitimate public purpose justifies the
regulation,’ and (iv) where there is a significant and legitimate purpose ‘whether the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislation’s
adoption.’
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The negative impact of the court’s decision on public workers is substantial. It leaves them vulnerable to the whims of the legislature and to
fiscally irresponsible state and local governing officials. The Smith holding
means that public employees could work up until several days before they
retire, counting on the benefits that their government-employer originally
presented to them and that were in effect during the tenure of their employment, and right before their retirement, the legislature could modify or
eliminate those benefits entirely. 151 What facilitated the court’s ruling were
three items. One item concerns the drafters’ inclusion of the phrase “accrued benefits” in the pension protection provision of 29(E)(5). Another
item deals with the drafters’ separation of the ideas that the contract cannot
be impaired or diminished from the language recognizing the existence of a
contract between public employers and employees. 152 Yet another item
concerns the reference in 29(F) to future changes to the retirement systems. 153 This language formally contemplates that the legislature can make
changes to the pension system; however, notice of proposed changes is
required. 154
Rather than the language in Sections 29 (A) and 29(B) operating to
grant substantial protection to public employees, it is undercut by section
29(E)(5)—a section which refers to accrual and, thus, opens the door to the
court interpreting vesting to occur other than at the moment one begins
one’s employment. Even though some may view the constitutional provisions and the court’s interpretation of them as allowing the appropriate
amount of flexibility for legislatures to maneuver in times of severe financial crisis, Louisiana’s view is destabilizing to local and state economies.

Id. at 1109. The test appears to allow for somewhat rigorous scrutiny of a pension modifying law but,
because only retirees can claim an impairment, it is of limited effectiveness with respect to preserving
pension benefits.
151. Id. at 1108 (“Likewise, we hold that reemployment benefits for retirees can be modified prior
to the point when the retirees become eligible for those benefits.”).
152. The language is in the same article. But the separation of the concepts into different sections
of that article allows for conflicting interpretations regarding pension rights. Sections 29 (A) and 29 (B)
recognize that an employer–employee contractual relationship exists between public employees who are
members of the public retirement system and the state. Section 29(E) precludes changes that diminish
or impair “accrued benefits.” LA. CONST. art. X, § 29. Despite the language acknowledging the formation of a contract between the government and public employees by virtue of being members of the
retirement system in 29(B), the Smith court relied upon the “accrual” language in section 29 (E) to
reason that impairment of benefits that have not yet been accrued is permissible under the state constitution. Smith v. Bd. of Tr. of Louisiana State Emp.s’ Ret. Sys., 851 So. 2d 1100, 1109–10 (La. 2003).
153. Section 29(F) provides in relevant part that “[b]enefit provisions for members of any public
retirement system, plan, or fund that is subject to legislative authority shall be altered only by legislative
enactment . . . .” LA. CONST. art. X, § 29(F).
154. LA. CONST. art. X, § 29.
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Furthermore, it assigns the primary risks of pension fund insolvency to
public workers.
Ohio’s approach towards pensions differs markedly from that of the
other states already examined, in that Ohio does not have a pension protection clause in its constitution. Instead, the definition of plan rights for
Ohio’s public employees is contained in numerous statutes that govern
various pension funds. This limited segmented approach, judging from the
STRS statutes, offers substantially less protection for plan participants
when compared to Illinois’ framework. Ohio’s treatment of public pensions
demonstrates that, where states fail to specifically carve out contractual
status for pensions, courts will be reluctant to afford them substantial protection. The Supreme Court of Ohio’s response to the plaintiff’s attempts in
State ex rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Retirement Board to draw upon the
language of contract 155 to stave off the application of changes to his wife’s
pension benefits supports this conclusion. Grounding its ruling in the unmistakability doctrine, 156 Ohio’s Supreme Court held that the relationship
between public employees and their employer is not one of contract. 157
Absent an express intention of the government to establish a contract, the
court declined to find one. 158 The Horvath court concluded that, “there is
nothing in any version of the Act evincing an intent on the part of the General Assembly to bind itself contractually to STRS participants.” 159 Except
for the language referencing the unmistakability doctrine, Ohio’s approach
is like Louisiana’s. Ohio does not recognize “a vested or contractual right
to defined STRS benefit levels upon commencement of public employment.” 160 In Horvath, this meant that “public school teachers do not possess
contract rights in any STRS benefits unless and until the benefit vests by
operation” of the relevant statute, which is pegged to when one retires. 161
Prior to vesting, the legislature can alter benefits for public employees. 162

155. 697 N.E.2d 644, 653–55 (Ohio 2007). The Horvath plaintiff’s arguments were based, in part,
on the contracts clause. Id. (plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the state was precluded by the state constitutional Contracts Clause from altering his wife’s pension plan).
156. The unmistakability doctrine requires that the legislature expressly declare its intentions to
“bind future legislatures” to overcome the court’s “presumption” that contractual rights are not prevailing in relationships between the government and others. Id. at 653.
157. Id. at 654.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 655.
162. Id. at 654.
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Another interesting aspect of Ohio’s public pension jurisprudence
concerns its treatment of constitutional property-based arguments and takings claims. This matter is explored below.
B. State Constitution Property-Based Rights: Pensions as Property
and the Takings Clause
Jack Beermann has observed that, “under current understandings government contractual promises may be considered property for constitutional
purposes.” 163 Instinctually, one may assume that property rights furnish
substantial protection to prospective pensioners. Certainly, from the perspective of the public employee, pension benefits feel like property they
will claim in the future regardless of the applicable vesting rules. However,
this assumption regarding property law’s potential to defend the interests of
pension holders is not borne out by Ohio’s case law. Property-based arguments afford less protection to public workers than ones that are contractbased. 164 This is the case for several reasons, beginning with the connection
between contract and property law claims. A preliminary step to recognizing a property right in pensions is the establishment of a contract between
public employees and the relevant government entity. 165 If one follows the
logic of the Horvath court, it is easy to understand how this initial hurdle
can immediately frustrate property-based arguments. If the contract between public employees and employers is not realized as being fully
formed until the end of one’s employment (i.e. until one attains retirement
age) then the property argument—from this narrow perspective—neither
enriches the analysis nor reinforces the employee’s claim. Property in one’s
pension is constituted when the contract is legally acknowledged.
According to Ohio’s Supreme Court, the statutes pertaining to pensions have the capacity to strip one’s property (e.g., one’s monetary contributions to the pension system) of its character as personal property and
transform it into public “statutory benefits.” 166 This interpretation disarms
163. Beermann, supra note 104, at 63.
164. See Beermann, supra note 104 at 63–64 (“the Takings Clause is unlikely to add much to
claims under the Contracts Clause because a participant’s interest in pension promises is unlikely to be
property unless it is found to be a contractual promise protected under the Contract Clause or state law
pension doctrine.”). See also T. Leigh Anenson et al., supra note 41, at 17, 20 (“the takings clause is not
much of a barrier to pension reform.”).
165. Maine Ass’n. of Retirees v. Bd. of Trustees of Maine Public Employment Retirement System,
758 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2014). Beermann, supra note 104, at 63–64.
166. The Horvath court held that “mandatory teacher contributions to the STRS result from economic legislation designed to benefit retired and disabled public school teachers and their survivors and
beneficiaries[] and, when placed in the fund, lose their character as private property.” 697 N.E.2d at 652
(citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.03) (footnote omitted).
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property-law-based arguments of their power. Legislative decisions will
then determine “the nature and extent of a contributor’s protected property
rights in the STRS.” 167 When viewed from a property law perspective, any
attempts to modify public pensions would be considered takings requiring
just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Framing pension rights in this way does not guarantee that they will be immune from attack. The federal constitution does not
preclude takings. It merely recognizes them and imposes due process and
compensatory requirements when they occur. In certain respects, given the
privileged construct of property owners and non-owners within the American legal system, it makes sense to view pensions as property. This orientation accords owners certain rights and privileges when appropriation is
threatened. When one considers, however, the state of federal takings jurisprudence, adopting this approach gets courts entangled in the messy work
of balancing the interests of pension holders with those of the larger society.
An argument that a new law takes one’s property by eliminating or
decreasing the value of benefits that were once promised places such
claims within the universe of regulatory takings. 168 If, however, the governmental entity sought to appropriate pension benefits that had already
been paid, in some jurisdictions, the pensioner could assert a physical takings claim. 169 Horvath offers insight into the outcome of a claim from a
regulatory takings perspective. In Horvath, the husband of a public employee brought an action to recover interest on his wife’s contributions to
the STRS following her death. Mr. Horvath alleged that the statute the state
adopted after his wife’s employment with STRS but prior to her death, 170
was a taking as to a portion of her retirement benefits in violation of the
takings provisions in the federal and Ohio constitutions. 171 The court ap167. Id.
168. See Beermann, supra note 104, at 64–65, n.234 (commenting on the difficulties of valuing
pension benefits within the framework of a regulatory takings claim).
169. See Beermann, supra note 104, at 64. The pensioner could also seek to recover the contributions he paid into the retirement system fund but not, necessarily, the interest that had accrued on those
contributions over time, as the Horvath case demonstrates. Id.
170. The wife died before she reached retirement age.
171. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution contains the Takings Clause, which provides
that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend.
V. Similarly, Article I § 19 of Ohio’s Constitution covers takings and provides:
Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare.
When taken in time of war or other public exigency, imperatively requiring its
immediate seizure or for the purpose of making or repairing roads, which shall be
open to the public, without charge, a compensation shall be made to the owner, in
money, and in all other cases, where private property shall be taken for public use,
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plied the three-prong balancing test that the United States Supreme Court
articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York. 172 When evaluating regulatory takings claims, the court must weigh three factors: (1)
“the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”; (2) “the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations”; and (3) “the character of the governmental action.” 173 This framework for takings determinations is fraught with numerous problems, not the
least of which is the second prong regarding what constitutes “distinct investment-backed expectations.” Many property law scholars have offered
noteworthy critiques of judicial approaches to regulatory takings. 174
The first prong of the Penn Central test is likely to bring the court
back to the question of whether the claimant has property in the pension
benefit he is claiming. That query will lead the court to assess whether the
individual’s right has vested or has not yet accrued. If the court determines
that the benefit has not accrued, as the Horvath court concluded, 175 this sets
up the plaintiff’s likely failure on the second prong. That is, if the plaintiff
does not have a property right in the benefit he seeks to preserve for his
retirement, then he could not have reasonable distinct investment-backed
expectations with respect to that benefit. 176 This is essentially the logic that
the Horvath court followed to hold that the Penn Central analysis weighed
“against finding a taking.” 177 Just as the Penn Central test proved unfavorable to Penn Central’s arguments—that relying upon its airspace to develop
its property in order to take advantage of the terminal’s prime location and
benefit from a lucrative lease with a tenant was within its reasonable distinct-investment backed expectation 178—pre-retiree participants in certain
a compensation therefor shall first be made in money, or first secured by a deposit
of money; and such compensation shall be assessed by a jury, without deduction
for benefits to any property of the owner.
172. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
173. Id. at 124. See State ex rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 650 (Ohio
2007).
174. , See e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1219–1336 (3d ed. 2016); Carol Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle?,
57 S. CA. L. REV. 561 (1984); Carol Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121 (1996);
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (Harv. U. Press 1995).
175. Horvath, 697 N.E.2d at 651 (“In Mrs. Horvath’s case, failure to reach retirement age cause
her potential STRS benefits to remain unrealized.”).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Despite having secured a multi-million-dollar lease with a commercial tenant, the court held
that New York’s Landmarks Preservation law, which precluded Penn Central’s tenant from constructing
a fifty-story office tower on top of its property without the Landmarks Preservation Commission’s
approval, did not constitute a taking. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 116
(1978).
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pension systems are likely to find arguments, regarding what is reasonable,
unhelpful. It is easy to manipulate the outcome of the test where there is no
anchoring pension clause that carves out a vested right upon entry into
public employment. While asserting that one has a property right in one’s
pensions is a component of the argument pension expectants will make, the
takings argument only gets one so far. Retirees will have the strongest takings arguments because at least with respect to the base pay (i.e. excluding
COLAs), courts would most likely deem their rights to those benefits to be
vested. If a takings claim is successful, the remedy could be an injunction
prohibiting the application of the law or just compensation. The former
would be better. The latter opens the potential for revaluation of the pension benefit in terms of the “just compensation” measure. In recessionary
times, depending upon whether the municipality or state is experiencing
economic duress, just compensation may not equate to a dollar for dollar
replacement of the benefit that is being removed from one’s benefit package. 179
Because the property-based approach entails a balancing test, it injects
a level of uncertainty in case outcomes, which seems counter to the objectives of public pensions. To the extent that governments utilize pension
benefits to attract employees and to spread compensation over a period that
is more manageable than paying higher salaries upfront, they should be
reliable in the payment of retirement benefits. The United States Supreme
Court has not always been consistent or clear in its articulation of the
standards for takings or their application. 180 While asserting that one’s
property has been taken may at first seem like a position of strength, in
practice—for those jurisdictions that adopt a property-based perspective—
it may render public workers more vulnerable to governmental restructuring of their plans. Notably, pensioners’ arguments grounded in property
law give rise to the counter-position of governments that modifications to
pensions are permissible under the state’s police powers and are necessary
when the health, safety, and welfare of a jurisdiction is threatened. 181

179. S Beermann, supra note 104, at, at 65–66 (highlighting the difficulty of calculating just
compensation for the government’s taking of pension benefits).
180. See e.g., Rose, Mahon Reconstructed, supra note 174, at 562–63, 597–99 (focusing on the
Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal case to discuss issues with takings jurisprudence and to offer clarifying
solutions); FISCHEL, supra note 174, at 14.
181. For example, Although Louisiana’s constitution recognizes a right to property, this section
apparently would not provide more shelter for pension holders than the protections under Article X,
primarily because it also includes language stating that it is “subject to reasonable statutory restrictions
and the reasonable exercise of police power.” LA. CONST. art I, § 4(A).
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C. Bankruptcy and the Federal Government’s Role in Resolving
the Public Pension Crisis
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tions are modified, “unions and public employees [will] have to learn how
much to trust deferred forms of compensation like pensions and retirement
health care.” 190 Creditors are likely to demand more upfront in terms of
loan fees and rates and workers will seek more in compensation to mitigate
the risk of doing business with government entities.
Notwithstanding the federal supremacy clause, the shortcomings of
Michigan’s provision, like Louisiana’s, are attributable to the use of the
word “accrued” in connection with benefits. 191 Even outside of the context
of bankruptcy the “accrual” language makes pension benefits that have not
vested susceptible to modification. The qualifying language inserts too
much uncertainty; it permits courts and legislators to repeatedly redefine
what constitutes “accrual” well after public workers have entered into employment on the assumption that, if they performed their duties in accordance with the rules that were in place at the time, they would be entitled to
claim their retirement benefits that were in effect at the time. From the
standpoint of protecting public employees, it is better to deal with the matter of accrual when calculating the benefits that are due.
Bankruptcy connotes fiscal crisis. Some municipalities may seriously
contemplate filing for bankruptcy as a solution to their financial dilemmas,
particularly with respect to pensions, because pension debt is indistinguishable from other kinds of debt. 192 This means that where municipalities can
justify renegotiating the debt, they can do so without running afoul of state
or federal constitutional constraints. Municipal bankruptcy, however, is a
solution with enormous costs. Therefore, despite some predictions that
Detroit’s ability to modify pensions relying upon this procedure sets a disturbing precedent for public employees with municipal pensions, 193 there
are substantial disincentives that should dissuade financially troubled cities
from rushing en masse to seek state approval to pursue this option. Stigma,
additional negative credit ratings, and incurring the distrust of future creditors and workers are some of the more potent reasons weighing against
selecting municipal bankruptcy. Municipal bankruptcy also presents a
problem for pensioners who would have the status of unsecured creditors.

190. Anderson, supra note 15, at 1153.
191. It provides in relevant part, “The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which
shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.” MI. CONST. art. IX, § 24.
192. Judge Steven Rhodes presided over the Michigan bankruptcy proceeding. In re city of Detroit,
504 B.R. at 150.
193. The New York Times reported one bankruptcy lawyer as commenting that, “‘If you end up
with precedent that allows the restructuring of retirement benefits in bankruptcy court, that will make it
an attractive option for cities.” Davey & Walsh, Billions in Debt, supra note 57 at 4.
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This means they would have low status priority in terms of receiving their
pension payments.
Another type of federal intervention is the bailout. Exploring this option fully is beyond this paper’s scope. Nonetheless, a few words on this
topic are warranted, given the consideration of the legal nature and limits of
pension rights herein. While it is premature to promote the possibility of a
federal bailout because it creates the wrong incentives for local and state
governments, and rewards their reckless behavior in failing to adequately
fund their pensions and invest pension money responsibly, the costs and
benefits of such a proposal should nonetheless be considered. Before approving this approach, state and local governments should consider whether there are a sufficient number of people or corporate entities residing in
the relevant jurisdiction with enough assets and income to generate the
required amount of revenue to cover the pension liability. Interim courses
of action should be taken, such as adjusting pension benefits for future
employees, valuing current pension liabilities properly, annually appropriating contributions for the pension funds, and raising taxes to spread the
burden of the debt obligations. If these adjustments are inadequate, federal
intervention may be appropriate. Another factor that should be included in
weighing the costs is whether the pensioners in a failed pension fund would
need to collect some other type of federal aid to survive. Assuming that
everyone who needed aid qualified for it in some form, would those costs
outweigh the costs of a bailout by the federal government? If deemed appropriate, the bailout would be a last resort option. The federal government
would need to clearly outline the criteria for selecting this course of action.
V. CONCLUSION
The importance of state constitutions in moments in which city and
state governments are enthralled in severe fiscal and political crisis should
not be disregarded. The current challenges, however, are not merely crises
of solvency. Municipalities and states are facing tough ethical and economic challenges that relate to labor, matters of fairness, and the public interest.
In weighing the public interest, as defined by government officials and
legislators, against the interests of pensioners to their retirement benefits,
the latter should prevail.
With respect to public pensions, constitutional clauses that are appropriately formulated—clearly delineating the rights of public employees and
the limitations on the powers of government to impinge upon those
rights—are valuable for several reasons. Such clauses inject a measure of
predictability and certainty in the relationship between public employers
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and employees. Employees can be confident that their employer will provide the retirement benefits they were offered as part of their employment
package at the time they were hired. Employers will know that they are not
permitted to renege on retirement benefits that individuals have relied upon
and accepted in connection with their employment. Thus, a constitutional
provision that is protective of pensioners’ rights should produce fiscally
responsible behavior, provided that courts also view the language as being
protective. Governments will be placed on notice that they don’t have the
option of covering budget shortfalls with pension funds and, therefore, they
will be incentivized to find alternative solutions. The burden is appropriately imposed on Government Public Pension Decision-makers because of
their superior positioning in making choices about the funding, management, and disbursement of pension benefits. Public decision-makers select
the contents of the retirement benefits package, determine the appropriate
contribution levels, decide whether to make contributions annually, select
the investment specialists who choose which funds the pension investments
should be placed in, and determine how the pension funds should be valued. Because they are the critical decision-makers, and because the actions
they take with respect to scaling down pension obligations are selfinterested, decisions to fix the pension funding deficits by eviscerating
pension obligations should be restrained by constitutional provisions and
met with extreme judicial skepticism. 194
A blanket constitutional provision that prohibits governments from
making harmful changes to pensions addresses the problem that plan participants in some states may face regarding coordinating quickly and efficiently to prevent the implementation of new laws that imperil their
benefits. It ensures the uniform protection of pensions within the state.
Because of the importance of such clauses, collective bargaining units,
pension-overseeing entities (e.g., boards of trustees) or pension fund representatives, and public employees should lobby for the inclusion of a pension protection clause in their state constitutions if they don’t currently
have one.
This comparison of state constitutional clauses and statutes pertaining
to public pensions in Illinois, Ohio, Louisiana, and Michigan, reveals that
placing constitutional limits on government power can achieve the goal of
protecting retirement benefits from the incursions of politicians, though it
depends upon how the protections clauses are drafted. The vulnerability of
194. Although where they are involved, the power of unions to negotiate for pension benefits
should not be discounted, the decisions concerning the funding of pensions rests with government
representatives.
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Louisiana’s and Michigan’s pension clauses to political maneuvering relates to their insufficient textual formulation. The Detroit and Stockton
examples suggest that, while these provisions may ultimately be penetrable
in the federal bankruptcy context, if the provisions are cast in language that
expressly prohibits altering retirement benefits for those that have joined a
retirement system, it provides a stronger legal foundation for those arguing
against such modifications.
One truism should be acknowledged: regardless of how infallible the
constitution drafters think a provision offering pension protection is, its
strength is ultimately defined by courts in the context of litigation. 195 In
their interpretation of constitutional pension protection clauses, courts are
uniquely positioned to give the protections their fullest expression. Rather
than adopting a deferential approach to legislative attempts to restructure
pension obligations, courts should more carefully scrutinize the changes
being proposed and the reasons prompting them. While this recommendation immerses courts in the thicket of reviewing difficult financial decisions
and political jockeying, this is necessary when an interest as fundamental
as the financial support of retirees is at stake. The work of the courts in
safeguarding public pensions is facilitated where there are strong constitutional provisions dedicated to this purpose. In the absence of such provisions, there are limits to what courts may properly do. Where the state
constitutional text is supportive—and provided that the judiciary is cooperative in reading the provisions as being protective of workers’ rights—the
positives identified above regarding predictability, uniformity, and properly
incentivizing the behavior of governments should be realized. At the very
least, subjecting restructuring proposals to a higher level of scrutiny
prompts governments to work harder to avoid a crisis and transmits the
message that more will be required to persuade the court that this is the best
option available to address the problem. Further, communicating to future
public-sector employees that a significant portion of their compensation
will not repeatedly be subjected to unilateral modification is likely to have
a positive effect on the ability of states and municipalities to attract and
retain workers. This outcome, in turn, should have a positive impact on
generating the essential revenue that municipalities need for sustenance and
growth.

195. With respect to fiscal limits, Briffault comments that, “[j]udicial interpretations have effectively nullified the public purpose requirements that ostensibly prevent state and local spending, lending, and borrowing in aid of private endeavors.” Briffault, supra note 10, at 909.

